Germany: Rail track charges will rise by 12.9% for freight carriers. What does this mean for your company?

Germany: Rail track charges will rise by 12.9% for freight carriers. What does this mean for your company?

Germany, 18 November 2026 — the Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) has issued a decision that will shake the European rail and intermodal transport market. The regulator approved an application by DB InfraGO — the state-owned rail infrastructure manager — for significant increases in track access charges (German: Trassenpreise). Although the average increase in rates is around 8 percent, the rail freight sector will feel it disproportionately more strongly: its rates will jump by as much as 12.9 percent. This decision has direct, multifaceted consequences for carriers, freight forwarders, intermodal operators and their financial partners across Europe — including Polish transport, shipping and logistics firms that are increasingly active in the western market.

Approved increases: striking figures

Before assessing the business impact and financial risks, it is worth taking a close look at the structure of the approved changes. The increases are not distributed evenly among all users of the rail network — they differ significantly by market segment:

  • Regional passenger transport (SPNV): increase of 7.7%
  • Long-distance passenger transport (Fernverkehr): increase of 5.0%
  • Rail freight transport (Schienengüterverkehr): increase of 12.9%

The difference is striking. Long-distance passenger transport — operated predominantly by DB Fernverkehr, a subsidiary of the Deutsche Bahn Group — receives relatively preferential treatment, with an increase below the rate of inflation. Meanwhile, the freight sector, in which many independent and private operators operate, must contend with an increase in operating costs almost three times higher than the increase in long-distance transport rates. Track access charges are levied for every kilometre travelled and constitute one of the key, unavoidable fixed cost components for every rail carrier. Their increase of nearly 13 percent means a real, immediate and very significant deterioration in the profitability of the entire sector.

Industry voice: “Massive cost shock”

Rail carriers are making no secret of their outrage. The “Die Güterbahnen” association, which represents the interests of private and independent rail operators, is openly warning of the consequences of this regulatory decision. Peter Westenberger, the organisation's managing director, states plainly that DB InfraGO is raising prices at a pace far exceeding current inflation rates. And this is happening at a particularly unfavourable time — when the federal budget is being forced to make substantial cuts to rail sector subsidies, while the long-promised reform of the infrastructure charging system remains on paper.

The combined effect of these factors is staggering. The association estimates that the total financial burden resulting from both higher infrastructure access charges and reduced public subsidies could in individual cases translate into an increase in operating costs of up to 75 percent. This is not an academic scenario — it is a real risk that could force many small and medium-sized operators into deep restructuring or even cessation of operations.

Direct financial risk for carriers: liquidity and covenants

From a credit risk analysis perspective, the situation is very serious. Rail transport is an industry characterised by high fixed costs, long investment cycles and relatively low operating margins. When a key cost component rises by nearly 13 percent without the possibility of offsetting it through revenue — at least not in the short term — the effects are swift and severe.

Companies are particularly at risk if they:

  • Have entered into long-term fixed-price contracts (fixed-price contracts) with industrial, distribution or retail customers that do not contain indexation clauses accounting for changes in infrastructure charges,
  • Operate with high financial leverage (English: financial leverage) and limited cash reserves,
  • Lack geographical or modal diversification that would allow them to shift volumes to other markets or modes of transport,
  • Have restrictive financial covenants in their loan agreements linked to EBITDA or the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR).

A drastic deterioration in EBITDA, resulting from the inability to pass cost increases on to customers quickly, may lead to breaches of these contractual conditions. As a result, banks and financial institutions lending to the rail sector may face the need to renegotiate financing terms or demand early repayment of liabilities. In extreme cases, particularly among smaller operators, insolvency becomes a real possibility.

Passing costs on to customers: inevitable inflationary pressure

Companies that survive the cost shock will have no choice but to renegotiate rates with their customers. The effects of this regulatory decision will therefore ripple widely through European supply chains. The first to feel the rise in rail freight prices will be:

  • Major industrial groups using rail to transport raw materials and semi-finished products (particularly the automotive, chemical and steel industries),
  • Retail chains and distributors optimising logistics on East–West routes,
  • Operators of intermodal platforms and container terminals,
  • Freight forwarders and freight brokers building offers based on rail traction services.

Rising rail freight prices directly feed into producer price indices (PPI) and, through them — with some delay — consumer inflation (CPI) as well. In an environment in which European central banks are struggling to stabilise inflation expectations, an additional cost impulse from the logistics sector is a signal that macroeconomic analysts cannot afford to dismiss.

Poland at the centre of the risk: intermodal carriers on the East–West corridor

Although the Bundesnetzagentur decision directly concerns infrastructure on German territory, its effects are by definition transnational. Germany occupies a central position in Europe's rail network — every transport operation on the East–West corridor, including container trains serving the New Silk Road (routes from China through Poland to Germany and further west), passes through this network.

Polish transport, shipping and logistics firms are in a particularly vulnerable position for several reasons:

  • Geographical transit dependence: a substantial share of the cargo handled by Polish intermodal operators must be transported through Germany, making DB InfraGO charges a direct component of cost calculations,
  • Multi-year contracts: many Polish freight forwarders have entered into customer contracts based on rates calculated without accounting for such a sharp rise in the infrastructure cost component,
  • Competitive pressure: rising rail costs may prompt western companies to review contracts with Polish operators, seeking cheaper alternatives or renegotiating terms.

We recommend that all Polish logistics companies with exposure to routes passing through Germany immediately review their budgets for the coming financial years and check the indexation clauses in existing agreements with counterparties and rail partners.

Threat to climate goals: modal shift in reverse?

There is another dimension to this decision which — although it may seem secondary to the direct financial risks — has serious long-term regulatory and reputational consequences for companies operating under ESG strategies.

For years, European climate policy (European Green Deal, FuelEU Maritime regulations, the “Fit for 55” package) has envisaged a systematic shift of freight from roads to rail and inland waterways (the so-called modal shift). Rail produces several times fewer emissions than truck transport — particularly when it uses electrified infrastructure powered by renewable energy.

The drastic increase in track access charges in Germany fundamentally undermines the economic foundations of this transition. If rail becomes more expensive and trucking — despite the costs of purchasing CO₂ emission allowances under the EU ETS — remains price-competitive, market forces will inevitably send some freight back onto congested motorways. This means:

  • Increased CO₂ emissions in the transport sector,
  • Worsening congestion on the road network,
  • Growing regulatory risk for companies that have publicly committed to reducing the carbon footprint of their supply chains.

Companies that have emphasised their commitment to rail as part of their logistics decarbonisation strategy in their sustainability reports or statements to investors (in accordance with CSRD) may face difficult questions from shareholders and ESG rating agencies.

Financial institutions' perspective: time to review portfolios

The Bundesnetzagentur decision should be a warning signal for all financial institutions with exposure to the rail and logistics sector linked to the German market. This applies in particular to:

  • Corporate banks financing rail carriers, rolling stock and intermodal terminal infrastructure,
  • Trade credit insurers (trade credit insurers), which should consider tightening underwriting criteria for exposures to rail operators heavily dependent on the DB network,
  • Private equity and infrastructure funds holding stakes in rail or logistics companies,
  • Factors and supply chain finance companies (SCF) whose portfolios contain receivables from and liabilities to entities directly exposed to the effects of the increase.

In particular, we recommend a thorough review of loan agreements for the adequacy of existing financial covenants and the performance of stress tests (stress tests) incorporating a scenario in which operating costs rise by 10–15% over the next 12 months for the most exposed entities.

Practical recommendations for logistics and transport companies

Based on the available data and risk assessment, companies in the transport, shipping and logistics sector should consider taking the following actions in the short and medium term:

  • Audit of counterparty agreements: review all long-term contracts for indexation clauses covering changes in infrastructure charges — and, where these are absent, promptly initiate renegotiations,
  • Review of operating budgets: immediately update financial plans for 2027 and subsequent periods to account for the higher rail network access cost component,
  • Analysis of modal alternatives: assess on which routes and for which types of cargo a temporary or permanent shift to other modes of transport may be cost-effective (road, short sea shipping, combined transport with a greater proportion of road legs),
  • Communication with customers: inform business partners transparently and proactively about inevitable price adjustments, supported by regulatory documentation — a price change resulting from a regulator's decision is much easier for a customer to accept than one motivated solely by internal margin requirements,
  • Monitoring further regulatory changes: track progress (or the lack thereof) on the announced reform of Germany's infrastructure charging system and similar processes in other EU countries.

Summary: a warning signal for the entire sector

The Bundesnetzagentur decision of 18 November 2026 is an event that extends far beyond the scope of a technical regulation concerning one country. In essence, it is a test of how resilient the European rail freight sector is in the face of growing cost pressure, the withdrawal of state infrastructure subsidies and a lack of consistency in pursuing ambitious climate goals. The result of this test, judging by the industry's reaction, is not encouraging.

For risk managers, logistics company owners and credit analysts, the key message is as follows: companies exposed to rail freight transport through Germany are entering the new financial year with significantly weakened cost fundamentals. Those that fail to respond quickly and strategically expose themselves to serious consequences — from margin erosion and liquidity problems to covenant breaches and the risk of restructuring. The time to act is now, not when the problem becomes visible in quarterly financial statements.

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